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I. INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment restrains the government from abridging 
the freedom of speech.1  When the government functions as an em-
ployer, it has interests “that differ significantly from those it possesses 
in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in gen-
eral.”2  The Supreme Court recognizes that when the government 
acts as an employer, it must be given some leeway to limit speech for 
it to operate efficiently and effectively.3  On the other hand, govern-
mental employ does not allow the government’s interest as an em-
ployer to commandeer the First Amendment analysis, for “[u]ncon-
strained discussion concerning the manner in which the government 
performs its duties is an essential element of the public discourse 
necessary to informed self-government.”4  The courts have struggled 
with this tension, but a relatively clear set of rules has emerged in the 
doctrine. 
Speech that is a matter of public concern, occurs outside of 
work, and does not interfere with the government’s ability to function 
is generally entitled to protection.5  Likewise, speech that relates to a 
matter of public concern, occurs at work, and does not impair the 
government’s ability to function is also generally entitled to protec-
tion.6  Speech that is purely personal to the employee in question and 
 
 ∗ J.D., 2006, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2003, New York Univer-
sity.  The Author would like to thank Prof. Thomas Healy for reviewing numerous 
drafts and providing valuable insight. 
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 3 See id. 
 4 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 161 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 5 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572–73, 574. 
 6 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384–85, 388 (1987). 
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that occurs at work is generally not entitled to protection.7  This 
Comment primarily addresses a fourth category of speech: speech 
that occurs outside the workplace, is wholly unrelated to work, and is 
not a matter of “public concern,” as the courts have defined the term. 
A handful of cases have addressed this issue.8  In evaluating 
whether speech is entitled to protection under the First Amendment, 
courts have generally applied the traditional framework set forth by 
the Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Education9 and Connick v. 
Myers.10  The Supreme Court’s analysis in Pickering requires courts to 
balance the interests of public employees, as citizens, “in commenting 
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it per-
forms through its employees.”11  Connick, which latched onto Pick-
ering’s public concern language, erected a threshold requirement 
that an employee must meet to even reach balancing under Pickering: 
the employee’s speech must touch upon a matter of public concern.12 
A problem with applying Connick’s holding to speech outside the 
workplace is that while the threshold requirement effectively disposes 
of cases involving speech that should not receive protection, it also 
prevents people from obtaining First Amendment protection for 
speech deserving of such protection.  That Connick’s threshold re-
quirement is not elastic enough is demonstrated in “at the work-
place” cases where courts have stretched the meaning of public con-
cern far beyond Connick’s conception of the term.13  The problem 
with Connick is not necessarily its result; rather, the problem is that its 
doctrinal design ignores a large universe of cases.14  Some courts have 
recognized the illogic of applying the Connick analysis in the context 
of employee speech that occurs outside of work, while other courts 
 
 7 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 154. 
 8 See Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 543 U.S. 77 
(2004); Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2003); Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 
F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2002); Eberhardt v. O’Malley, 17 F.3d 1023 (7th Cir. 1994); 
Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1989); Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992 
(4th Cir. 1985). 
 9 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 10 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 11 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
 12 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146–48. 
 13 See, e.g., Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1050–52 (6th Cir. 
2001) (holding that a schoolteacher’s speech regarding the beneficial environmental 
effects of industrial hemp constituted a matter of public concern). 
 14 See infra Part III. 
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have simply avoided the Connick analysis entirely.15  Courts that have 
attempted to apply Connick to speech that occurred outside the work-
place have simply contorted Connick to the point where it has been 
rendered meaningless. 
This Comment explains why current Supreme Court jurispru-
dence has proven inadequate in dealing with employee speech that 
occurs outside the workplace.  Part II explains the law that governs 
public employee speech under the First Amendment.  Part III ad-
dresses how the lower courts have dealt with speech that does not re-
late to work and occurs away from the workplace.  Part III also re-
counts the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on the 
subject.  Part IV analyzes the state of the law and explains why the 
Court’s treatment of the issue begs for a fresh doctrinal approach.  
Part V advocates the formulation of a new test for speech that occurs 
outside the workplace.  Specifically, Part V proposes the abandon-
ment of Connick’s public concern requirement for all cases in which 
the speech occurs outside the workplace.  For matters that are work-
related, the employer should have to justify adverse employment de-
cisions against employees under Pickering.  For matters wholly unre-
lated to work, the speech should be presumptively protected unless 
the government employer shows actual harm or the specter of immi-
nent harm to the workplace. 
 
 15 Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 543 
U.S. 77 (2004) (holding that public concern is automatically satisfied when the 
speech is not about work, occurs outside of work, and is directed towards the general 
public); Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 186 (2d Cir. 2003) (avoiding the public 
concern question by assuming without deciding that the threshold was fulfilled after 
recognizing that many courts have questioned whether the “test is appropriate in 
cases like the present one”); Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 146 (2d Cir. 2002) (as-
suming without deciding that the public concern test was met); Eberhardt v. 
O’Malley, 17 F.3d 1023, 1026 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the public concern test is 
designed to distinguish personal employee grievances rather than fix the outer limits 
of what the First Amendment protects); Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1564 
(10th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he public concern test does not apply when public employee 
nonverbal protected expression does not occur at work and is not about work.”); 
Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998 (4th Cir. 1985) (observing that the public con-
cern test should be confined to cases that involve employee speech that is purely per-
sonal to the employee, such as grievances).  The Author would like to note that 
shortly before publication, the Second Circuit issued its decision in Locurto v. 
Giuliani. Nos. 04-6480-cv(L), 04-6498-cv(CON), 04-6499-cv(CON), 2006 WL 1130906  
(2d Cir. Apr. 27, 2006).  As relevant to this Comment, Locurto held that “the public 
concern test does not apply neatly as a threshold test for expression unrelated to Gov-
ernment employment.”   Id. at *12.  Only insofar as Locurto so held, the Author 
agrees.  See infra Parts IV and V. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Public employees enjoy at least some First Amendment protec-
tion.  The Supreme Court first recognized this principle in Keyishian 
v. Board of Regents,16 which repudiated a long line of cases17 that clung 
hard and fast to Justice Holmes’s famous admonition that a police-
man “may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no 
constitutional right to be a policeman.”18  In Keyishian, the Court held 
unconstitutional New York statutes that barred public employment to 
members of subversive organizations.19  The Court’s decision in Keyi-
shian was the culmination of cases in the 1950’s and 60’s that attacked 
state practices of forcing public employees to swear oaths of loyalty 
and to reveal their political associations.  In Wiemann v. Updegraff,20 
the Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma state law that required 
all state officers and employees to swear loyalty oaths and to reveal 
their associational activities.21  Similarly, in Shelton v. Tucker,22 the 
Court held it impermissible to condition schoolteachers’ employment 
on the requirement that they file affidavits listing the names and ad-
dresses of any group or organization they had belonged to in the pre-
vious five years.23  Finally, in Keyishian, the Court quoted approvingly 
the language of Sherbert v. Verner:24  “‘It is too late in the day to doubt 
that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the 
denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.’”25  In 
1968, the Court decided Pickering, which articulated the current stan-
dard for evaluating whether or not employee speech is protected by 
the First Amendment. 
 
 16 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
 17 See, e.g., Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 491–95 (1952) (holding constitu-
tional a New York law that punished school teachers who spoke seditious words or 
engaged in seditious acts); Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 720–24 (1951) 
(holding constitutional a California law requiring, inter alia, public employees to 
swear they neither had not been and were not members of the communist party);  
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94–104 (1947) (holding constitutional 
the Hatch Act, a federal law regulating the political activities of federal employees); 
United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 398–99 (1930) (upholding against constitu-
tional challenge the Federal Corrupt Practices Act). 
 18 McAullife v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). 
 19 Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 597–610. 
 20 344 U.S. 183 (1952). 
 21 Id. at 185. 
 22 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
 23 Id. at 487–90. 
 24 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 25 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 606 (1967) (quoting Sherbert, 374 
U.S. at 404). 
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In February of 1961, the Board of Education of Township High 
School District 205 in Will County, Illinois, sought approval by the 
voters of a bond referendum of $4,875,000, seeking to build two new 
schools.26  The voters rejected the proposal.27  In December of the 
same year, the Board offered another proposal, this time seeking to 
raise $5,500,000 for the construction of two new schools.28  The sec-
ond proposal passed.29  Almost three years later, in 1964, the Board 
proposed a tax increase that the citizens voted down.30  Later that 
year, the tax increase was again submitted to the voters who, once 
again, defeated it.31  Via the local newspaper, the local teachers or-
ganization had urged voters to approve the tax hike, arguing that de-
feating it would decrease the quality of education provided by the 
schools.32  Two days before the second vote, the paper published a let-
ter from the superintendent of schools urging the voters to approve 
the increase.33 
In response to the campaign for the tax increase, Marvin 
Pickering, a schoolteacher in the district, wrote a letter expressing 
disagreement with the way the Board handled the 1961 bond issue.34  
Pickering also took issue with the Board’s allocation of financial re-
sources as between its educational and athletic programs.35  Finally, 
Pickering charged the superintendent “with attempting to prevent 
teachers in the district from opposing or criticizing the proposed 
bond issue.”36 
Pickering was fired for writing the letter.37  At the Board hearing, 
the Board alleged that  Pickering’s letter contained numerous falsi-
ties and that the letter’s publication unjustifiably harmed the integrity 
of the Board and the administration.38  Pickering’s letter, the Board 
argued, “would tend to foment controversy, conflict, and dissension 
among teachers, administrators, the Board of Education, and the 
 
 26 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565 (1968). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 565–66. 
 30 Id. at 566. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566–67. 
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residents of the district.”39  Pickering brought a lawsuit in the state 
circuit court, which upheld his dismissal.40  Over the dissent of two 
justices, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.41 
In an opinion by Justice Marshall, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed.42  The Court began its opinion by identifying the 
competing interests in these cases: “the interests of the teacher, as a 
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the in-
terest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the 
public services it performs through its employees.”43  The Court, first 
evaluating the truthful aspects of Pickering’s letter, observed that this 
was not a case in which Pickering’s letter would have an adverse effect 
on his employment relationships with either the Board or the super-
intendent.44  The Court thus rejected the Board’s position that truth-
ful statements can warrant dismissal due to their inherently critical 
nature.45  Turning to Pickering’s false statements,46 the Court held 
that there was simply no evidence showing that the letter impeded 
Pickering’s performance of his duties or interfered with the opera-
tion of the schools.47  The Court concluded, “the interest of the 
school administration in limiting teachers’ opportunities to contrib-
ute to public debate is not significantly greater than its interest in lim-
iting a similar contribution by any member of the general public.”48 
Fifteen years later, the Court revisited the employee speech issue 
in Connick v. Myers.  Connick erected a threshold requirement that 
public employees must meet to even reach the Pickering balancing 
test.  Sheila Myers was an Assistant District Attorney in New Orleans.49  
Harry Connick was the District Attorney of New Orleans.50  In Octo-
ber of 1980, Connick told Myers that she would be transferred to an-
other division of criminal court.51  Although Myers strongly objected 
to the transfer,52 Connick urged her to accept the reassignment.53  
 
 39 Id. at 567 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 40 Id. at 565. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 568. 
 44 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 570–73. 
 47 Id. at 572–73. 
 48 Id. at 573. 
 49 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
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Myers prepared a questionnaire designed to elicit the views of her fel-
low workers on matters regarding, among other things, office transfer 
policy and morale.54  Myers distributed the questionnaire to fifteen 
assistant district attorneys.55  One of her supervisors learned that she 
was distributing the survey and informed Connick that “Myers was 
creating a ‘mini-insurrection’ within the office.”56  Connick then ter-
minated Myers for failing to accept the transfer.57  He also told Myers 
that he considered the distribution of the questionnaire an act of in-
subordination.58 
Myers filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging she was 
wrongfully terminated because the First Amendment protected the 
speech in which she had engaged.59  She prevailed in the district 
court, which ordered her reinstatement and awarded her damages.60  
Connick appealed and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.61  In an opinion by 
Justice White, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court 
of appeals.62 
The Court concluded that Pickering and its progeny stood for the 
proposition that courts should not examine the government’s reasons 
for discharging an employee when the employee’s speech does not 
touch upon a matter of public concern.63  Indeed, “[w]hen employee 
expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of 
political, social, or other concern to the community,” the government 
should essentially wield its power to do all that is necessary to effi-
ciently run its offices without judicial oversight.64  Courts are not ap-
propriate forums to address personnel decisions made by public 
agencies when they involve matters of personal interest.65  To deter-
mine whether an employee’s speech touches upon a matter of public 
concern, courts must look to the “content, form, and context of a 
given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”66  The Court found 
 
 53 Id. at 141. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Connick, 461 U.S. at 141. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 141–42. 
 61 Connick, 461 U.S. at 142. 
 62 Id. at 142–54. 
 63 Id. at 146. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 147. 
 66 Id. at 147–48. 
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that Myers’s questionnaire, save one exception,67 did not touch upon 
matters of public concern.68  Indeed, Myers’s questions were “mere 
extensions of [her] dispute over her transfer to another section of 
the criminal court.”69  They were not matters of public concern  
because they did not seek to inform the public about the District At-
torney’s Office.70  The Court did not engage in Pickering balancing 
because Myers’s statements did not meet the public concern thresh-
old.71 
Justice Brennan filed a dissent.  First, Justice Brennan argued 
that the manner and context of the employee’s statement is not rele-
vant to the public concern analysis.72  The manner and context is 
relevant in the second part of Pickering’s analysis—whether or not the 
speech harms the employer’s interests—but whether an employee 
chooses to express his grievance in private or in public should be ir-
relevant in the public concern calculus.73  Next, Justice Brennan 
strenuously argued that the First Amendment vigilantly protects “the 
dissemination of information on the basis of which members of our 
society may make reasoned decisions about the government.”74  As 
such, it is crucial that statements critical of public officials fall within 
the ambit of the First Amendment’s protection.75  Justice Brennan 
chided the majority for adopting a narrow conception of public con-
cern, arguing the majority’s fear that every remark by a public em-
ployee would “‘plant the seed of a constitutional case’” was un-
founded.76  By adopting such a narrow conception, the majority 
wrested from the people the determination of whether employee 
speech had utility and gave the choice to judges.77  Justice Brennan 
argued that it was more consistent with the First Amendment to 
evaluate employee speech by asking whether or not the speech inter-
 
 67 Connick, 461 U.S. at 149.  The Court found that Myers’s question whether any 
of the assistant district attorneys “ever [felt] pressured to work in political campaigns 
on behalf of office supported candidates” involved a matter of public concern.  Id.  
The Court concluded nonetheless, under the rationale of Pickering, that Connick was 
justified in discharging Myers.  See id. at 154. 
 68 Id. at 148. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 154 
 72 Id. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 161 (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966)). 
 75 Id. at 162. 
 76 Id. at 164 (quoting the majority opinion at 149). 
 77 Connick, 461 U.S. at 165 (Brennan J., dissenting). 
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fered with the “performance of governmental functions and in pre-
serving employee discipline and harmony.”78 
A few years later, in Rankin v. McPherson,79 the Court had an op-
portunity to address employee speech that took place at work, but was 
completely unrelated to work.  Ardith McPherson was a deputy con-
stable in the office of the Constable of Harris County, Texas.80  On 
March 30, 1981, McPherson and some of her fellow co-workers heard 
on the radio that there had been an assassination attempt on Presi-
dent Reagan’s life.81  McPherson subsequently engaged in a conversa-
tion with Lawrence Jackson, her boyfriend, where she said, in perti-
nent part: “[I]f they go for him again, I hope they get him.”82  A co-
worker overheard McPherson’s remark and reported it to Constable 
Walter Rankin.83  McPherson confessed to making the statement, but 
said that she “didn’t mean anything by it.”84  Rankin subsequently 
fired McPherson.85 
McPherson filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging 
that Rankin, in terminating McPherson’s employment, had violated 
her constitutional rights.86  The district court granted summary judg-
ment to Rankin, holding that McPherson’s speech was unprotected.87  
The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded for trial.88  On remand, the 
district court ruled that the statements were unprotected, and the 
court of appeals again reversed, holding that McPherson’s statement 
touched upon a matter of public concern.89  The appellate court then 
engaged in balancing under Pickering, concluding that because 
McPherson’s duties were ministerial in nature and “‘her potential for 
undermining the office’s mission so trivial,’” the government’s inter-
est in maintaining an efficient workplace did not outweigh McPher-
son’s interest in her speech.90 
 
 78 Id. 
 79 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
 80 Id. at 380. 
 81 Id. at 381. 
 82 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 382 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 85 Rankin, 483 U.S. at 382. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 382. 
 89 Id. at 383. 
 90 Id. (quoting McPherson v. Rankin, 786 F.2d 1233, 1239 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
SHOOMAN FINAL 5/30/2006  9:26:22 PM 
1350 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1341 
In an opinion by Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court affirmed.91  
The Court turned to the threshold test set forth in Connick: whether 
McPherson’s speech touched upon a matter of public concern.92  The 
Court held that McPherson’s statement “plainly dealt with a matter of 
public concern.”93  The Court considered the context in which 
McPherson made the statement, during the course of a conversation 
discussing the President’s policies.94  The Court concluded that 
McPherson’s statement was not a threat to kill the President,95 and 
that the inappropriateness of McPherson’s statement was irrelevant to 
the public concern analysis.96  The Court quoted New York Times v. 
Sullivan,97 observing that public debate sometimes includes sharp, 
caustic attacks on public officials.98  Turning to balancing under 
Pickering, the Court held that Rankin had failed to show that the em-
ployer’s interest in maintaining an efficient workplace outweighed 
McPherson’s right to free speech.99  The Court concluded that Ran-
kin did not inquire as to whether McPherson’s statement disrupted 
the work of the office.100  Furthermore, because she made her state-
ment in private, no evidence existed that McPherson disparaged the 
office of the constable.101  McPherson’s statement was neither related 
to the functioning of the office nor to her ability to perform her 
work.102 
Justice Marshall concluded by noting the importance of consid-
ering the duties and responsibilities of the employee when the State 
argues that it is necessary to discharge an employee because the em-
ployee’s speech undermines the functioning of a government of-
fice.103  Justice Marshall determined that where the employee is not a 
 
 91 Rankin, 483 U.S. at 383. 
 92 Id. at 384. 
 93 Id. at 386. 
 94 Id. at 386.  Indeed, McPherson testified that before she uttered “I hope they 
get him,” Jackson was speaking about the President’s policies on welfare, Medicaid, 
and food stamps.  Id. at 381. 
 95 Under federal statutes, a threat to kill the President is unprotected speech.  See 
18 U.S.C. §§ 871(a), 2385 (2000). 
 96 Rankin, 483 U.S. at 387. 
 97 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 
 98 Rankin, 483 U.S. at 387 (“‘Debate on public issues should be uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open, and . . . may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes un-
pleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.’”) (ellipses in original) 
(quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270). 
 99 Rankin, 483 U.S. at 389. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 390–92. 
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policy maker or does not serve in a public capacity, “the danger to 
the agency’s successful functioning from that employee’s private 
speech is minimal.”104  Accordingly, Justice Marshall found that 
McPherson’s duties were purely clerical and, thus, she was not in-
volved with any law enforcement function of the constable’s office.105  
Consequently, the office’s interest in maintaining an efficient work-
place did not outweigh McPherson’s First Amendment rights.106 
Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion.107  In Justice Powell’s 
view, it was unnecessary for the Court to engage in the analysis re-
quired by Connick and Pickering because it will only be the “unusual 
case” where the employer will have such an overriding interest in 
maintaining an efficient workplace that it will be justified in punish-
ing an employee for making “a single, offhand comment directed to 
only one other worker . . . .”108  Notwithstanding, Justice Powell 
agreed with the Court’s Connick and Pickering analysis of McPherson’s 
speech.109 
Justice Scalia dissented,110 arguing that McPherson’s statement 
clearly did not touch upon a matter of public concern.111  Justice 
Scalia rejected the majority’s attempt to contextualize McPherson’s 
statement and argued that McPherson’s criticisms of President 
Reagan’s policies merely fashioned her motives for uttering her re-
mark, rather than actually forming the basis of its content.112  Justice 
Scalia concluded that McPherson’s statement was very near the cate-
gory of speech that was unprotected.  For support, Justice Scalia cited 
cases that dealt with fighting words113 and advocacy of force or vio-
lence,114 arguing that such speech could not possibly fall within the 
ambit of the First Amendment’s protection.115  Justice Scalia also took 
issue with the majority’s contention that the government’s interest in 
maintaining a successfully functioning workplace is diminished when 
 
 104 Id. at 390–91. 
 105 Rankin, 483 U.S. at 392. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 392–94 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 108 Id. at 393. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Rankin, 483 U.S. at 394–401 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 111 Id. at 396. 
 112 Id. at 396–97. 
 113 Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (holding that fighting 
words are unprotected by the First Amendment). 
 114 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (holding that incitement of 
violence is unprotected by the First Amendment). 
 115 Rankin, 483 U.S. at 397–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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the speech of a low-level, non-policymaking employee is at issue.116  
Employees such as McPherson, Justice Scalia argued, “can hurt work-
ing relationships and undermine public confidence in an organiza-
tion every bit as much as policymaking employees.”117  Justice Scalia 
gave a number of examples of the type of conduct that would be pro-
tected under the majority’s ruling, such as non-policymaking em-
ployees of the EEOC being permitted to make remarks approving of 
racial discrimination on the job, or employees of the Selective Service 
System urging refusal to comply with the draft laws.118 
The Court expounded upon Connick’s definition of public con-
cern in United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (National 
Treasury).119  The case involved a challenge to a 1989 federal law that 
prohibited federal employees from accepting compensation for de-
livering speeches or writing articles, even if those speeches or articles 
were unrelated to the employee’s employment.120  Both the district 
court and the court of appeals invalidated the law insofar as it applied 
to Executive Branch employees.121  The Supreme Court affirmed in 
part and reversed in part.122  The Court’s decision in National Treasury 
is relevant to this Comment in two key respects: its discussion of Con-
nick and Justice O’Connor’s concurrence. 
The Court applied Connick because the case involved a burden 
on employee speech and the Court held that the speech at issue 
touched upon matters of public concern.123  The speech did not in-
volve “employee comment on matters related to personal status in the 
workplace.”124  The Court held that the speech was addressed to a 
public audience, was made outside the workplace, and was largely un-
related to the plaintiffs’ government employment.125  Accordingly, the 
Court applied Pickering. 
 
 116 Id. at 400–01. 
 117 Id. at 400. 
 118 Id. at 400–01. 
 119 513 U.S. 454 (1995). 
 120 Id. at 457. 
 121 Id. at 462–63. 
 122 Id. at 480.  Specifically, the Court upheld the enjoinment of the statute insofar 
as it applied to the specific plaintiffs who brought the suit, but the Court reversed the 
judgment insofar as it granted relief to parties who were not before the court.  Id. 
 123 Id. at 466.  The speech that the plaintiffs engaged in comprised of, inter alia, a 
Postal Service employee giving speeches on the Quaker religion, a tax examiner writ-
ing articles about the environment, and a scientist at the FDA who wrote articles re-
viewing dance performances.  Nat’l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 461–62. 
 124 Id. at 466. 
 125 Id. 
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Justice O’Connor concurred in part and dissented in part.126  
While Justice O’Connor focused primarily on the government’s in-
terests in adopting the honoraria ban127 and the remedy adopted by 
the Court,128 the opinion also briefly analyzed why the speech in the 
case did not implicate Connick’s public concern threshold question.129  
Justice O’Connor wrote that the plaintiffs challenged the law as it ap-
plied to speech that occurred outside the workplace and was unre-
lated to the plaintiffs’ government employment—“speech that by 
definition does not relate to internal office affairs or the employee’s 
status as an employee.”130 
III. THE CIRCUIT COURTS WRESTLE WITH CONNICK 
The lower courts have had difficulty applying Connick to fact pat-
terns involving employee conduct that occurred outside the work-
place and was unrelated to work.  In Berger v. Battaglia,131 the Fourth 
Circuit explained that Connick should be read narrowly and apply 
only to fact patterns like the one involved in Connick itself.  The court 
in Flanagan v. Munger132 held that Connick does not apply at all in cases 
that involve employee speech that occurs outside the workplace and 
is unrelated to the employee’s government employment.  Finally, in 
Roe v. City of San Diego,133 recently overturned by the Supreme Court,134 
the Ninth Circuit conducted a full blown analysis from Connick to Na-
tional Treasury, synthesizing the case law to conclude that the em-
ployee speech at issue touched upon a matter of public concern.135 
A. Connick Should Be Read Narrowly 
Berger v. Battaglia, decided soon after Connick, involved Robert M. 
Berger, a police officer with the Baltimore Police Department.136  
During his off-duty hours, Berger performed a musical and singing 
act, not affiliated with his position as a police officer or the depart-
ment, a part of which contained an impersonation of the singer Al 
 
 126 Id. at 480 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 127 Id. at 480–85. 
 128 Id. at 485–89. 
 129 Nat’l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 480 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 130 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 131 779 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 132 890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1989). 
 133 356 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 543 U.S. 77 (2004). 
 134 543 U.S. 77 (2004). 
 135 Roe, 356 F.3d at 1115–22. 
 136 Berger, 779 F.2d at 993. 
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Jolson.137  To impersonate Jolson, Berger wore blackface makeup and 
a black wig.138  Berger sought to entertain people; at no point did  
he make derogatory or inflammatory remarks or seek confronta-
tion.139  Eventually, Berger became well known for his act and entered 
into an agreement with the Baltimore Hilton Hotel to perform.140  
The Hilton advertised Berger’s performance in the local newspaper 
with a picture of Berger in blackface.141  The advertisement offended 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(“NAACP”), which eventually succeeded in getting a show cancelled 
due to rumors that its members would storm the stage if Berger per-
formed his act in blackface.142 
After the cancellation of the show, the police department re-
ceived complaints from black citizens and from the NAACP.143  The 
department then ordered Berger, who was then on light-duty status, 
to cease all public performances of his act.144  When Berger returned 
to full duty status, his commanding officer ordered him not to wear 
blackface in public.145  But Berger continued to perform in blackface, 
even after he was ordered not to, without incident or complaint.146  
He sought permission from the department to receive pay for his per-
formances and his request was denied.147 
Berger subsequently brought suit in federal district court, alleg-
ing that the department had violated his right to free speech.148  The 
district court entered judgment in favor of the department despite 
finding that Berger’s speech touched upon a matter of public con-
cern.149  The court struck the balance under Pickering in favor of the 
department because the department had an overpowering interest in 
maintaining good relations with Baltimore’s black community and 
 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 994. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Berger, 779 F.2d at 994–95. 
 143 Id. at 995. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 996. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Berger, 779 F.2d at 996. 
 149 Id. 
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averting future disruptions.150  Berger appealed, and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit reversed.151 
The Fourth Circuit held that the public concern test is more 
properly suited to address a category of speech that is not protected 
than to fix the First Amendment’s outer limits of protection.152  Ac-
cordingly, the speech that is not entitled to protection is speech that 
is of personal concern to the employee, such as a personnel griev-
ance.153  The appropriate inquiry, the court held, is whether the pub-
lic would be concerned with the expression or whether the employee 
speech is merely “a private matter between employer and em-
ployee.”154  Applying this test, the court held that Berger’s perform-
ances were of concern to the community and they were obviously of 
public interest because the public willingly paid to see him perform.155  
Moreover, the court held that the balance under Pickering should be 
struck in favor of Berger and remanded the case to the district court 
for further proceedings.156 
B. Connick Does Not Apply at All 
Flanagan v. Munger concerned three police officers in the Colo-
rado Springs Police Department, along with an investor named Rich-
ard Paul, who together formed a corporation to open and operate a 
video rental store.157  Paul procured 2500 used video tapes for the 
company, 100 of which were adult films.158  The films were available 
only to persons twenty-one and older, and only the film titles were 
visible from the shelf.159  James Munger, the chief of police, received 
an anonymous letter alleging that certain police officers “were co-
owners of a Porno Video business.”160  Munger conducted an investi-
gation and concluded that the officers were violating or had violated 
the department’s regulation concerning off-duty employment.161  
Munger subsequently asked the officers to remove the adult films 
 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 993, 1003. 
 152 Id. at 998. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Berger, 779 F.2d at 999 (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 999–1003. 
 157 Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1560 (10th Cir. 1989). 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 161 Id. 
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from their inventory.162  He also told the officers that they would re-
ceive a reprimand for violating departmental regulations.163  The offi-
cers removed the adult films from the store’s shelves.164 
Thereafter, a local reporter contacted one of the officers, asking 
him to verify information that the officers ran a video store that 
rented adult films and that the officers were reprimanded for their 
activities.165  After the conversation, the officers arranged a meeting 
with Chief Munger.166  Munger then spoke to the local media and an-
nounced the imposition of written reprimands against the officers.167  
The officers filed suit in federal district court, alleging that, inter alia, 
their First Amendment rights had been violated.168  The district court 
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all causes 
of action.169  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in 
part and reversed in part.170 
Analyzing the officers’ First Amendment claim, the court first 
noted that the fact pattern was conceptually different from the arche-
typal Pickering/Connick fact patterns because the conduct at issue—the 
officers’ stocking their video store with adult films—occurred off the 
job and was unrelated to the officers’ government employment.171  
The court held that Connick did not apply to the case because it in-
volved nonverbal protected expression that neither occurred at work 
nor was about work.172  The court first wrestled with the notion that 
placing sexually explicit videos for rent in a video store could some-
how qualify as a matter of public concern; indeed, the court noted, it 
is difficult to see how it possibly could.173  Next, the court noted that 
when a statement is made at or about work, the public concern test 
makes sense because the distinction to be made is whether the state-
ment takes on some significance outside the workplace or whether 
the statement is purely personal to the employee’s employment.174  
Where the facts involve speech that is non-work related and occurred 
 
 162 Id. 
 163 Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1561. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1561. 
 170 Id. at 1572. 
 171 Id. at 1562. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. at 1563. 
 174 Id. at 1564. 
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outside the workplace, the court distinguished, “the purpose behind 
using the public concern test is simply irrelevant.”175  The court ob-
served that the purpose of Connick, as Connick itself observed, was to 
weed out lawsuits concerning employee speech where the employee 
was speaking on matters of purely personal interest.176 
Accordingly, the court held that the public concern test did not 
apply.177  Instead, the court developed an alternative test that it said 
could fulfill the same function as the public concern test.178  The test 
is simply whether the speech itself involves protected expression.179  If 
it does, then courts should balance, pursuant to Pickering, the em-
ployee’s right against the employer’s right to run its operation effi-
ciently.180 
C. A Full Blown Analysis Under Connick and National Treasury 
John Roe, the plaintiff in Roe v. City of San Diego, sold sexually 
explicit videos of himself on eBay while serving as a police officer in 
San Diego.181  Roe wore a generic police uniform in the videos.182  
Roe’s supervisor became aware of Roe’s activities and discovered cer-
tain items offered for sale by Roe, including a uniform formerly used 
by the San Diego Police Department.183  The department began an 
investigation into Roe’s activities, purchasing items from him.184  At 
no time did Roe identify himself by name or as a San Diego Police of-
ficer.185  Eventually, one of Roe’s supervisors interviewed Roe about 
his sale of videos and other items on eBay and Roe admitted to the 
conduct.186  The department concluded that Roe had violated three 
department policies and ordered Roe to stop selling or distributing 
sexually explicit materials over the Internet.187 
 
 175 Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1564. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. at 1565. 
 181 Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1109–10 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 543 
U.S. 77 (2004). 
 182 Id. at 1110. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. at 1110–11. 
 186 Id. at 1111. 
 187 Roe, 356 F.3d at 1111. 
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Roe subsequently removed the items he had listed for sale, but 
he did not change his seller’s profile on eBay.188  His profile described 
two sexually explicit videos he had produced,  the prices of the two 
videos, and the price he charged to make custom videos.189  Roe was 
then charged with violating a fourth departmental policy and disci-
plinary action was recommended.190  The department terminated 
Roe’s employment.191  Roe filed suit in federal district court, alleging 
that he was terminated in violation of his First Amendment right to 
freedom of speech.192  The district court dismissed Roe’s complaint 
for failure to state a claim.193  The Ninth Circuit reversed.194 
The court first noted the purpose of the public concern test is 
“to avoid the constitutionalization of common workplace grievances 
between public employers and employees.”195  The court understood 
Connick not to give a precise definition of public concern.196  None-
theless, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in Connick that the issue in the Connick plaintiff’s questionnaire—
whether employees were pressured to work on political campaigns—
touched upon a matter of public concern.197  The court proceeded to 
observe that the typical public concern case involves employee criti-
cism of an employer’s policy, specific actions, or supervisory person-
nel.198  Additionally, the panel noted its circuit’s penchant for reading 
public concern broadly when internal disputes or power struggles 
were not at issue.199  The panel, however, distinguished the case be-
fore the court because the employee conduct occurred outside the 
workplace.200 
Next, the court looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in Na-
tional Treasury.201  The court relied heavily on National Treasury’s brief 
observations that none of the speech in that case was related to the 
employee’s employment and the speech occurred outside the work-
 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Roe, 356 F.3d at 1111. 
 194 Id. at 1110. 
 195 Id. at 1115 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983)). 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 148). 
 198 Id. at 1116 (quoting Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 997 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
 199 Roe, 356 F.3d at 1117 (citations omitted). 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. 
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place.202  Furthermore, the court then quoted approvingly the Fourth 
Circuit’s holding in Berger for the proposition that speech that is not 
purely personal to the employee is at least entitled to qualified pro-
tection.203  Citing Berger and a Ninth Circuit case that adopted Berger204 
for support, the court explained that public concern as set forth in 
Connick served a narrow purpose: “to preempt a narrow category of 
claims involving speech related to a public employee’s status in the 
workplace.”205  Accordingly, the court held that when speech is not 
about the employer or employment, is directed to the general public, 
and occurs away from the workplace, the speech touches upon a mat-
ter of public concern.206 
D. Roe Is Overruled 
Deciding the case solely on the briefs, the Supreme Court re-
versed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Roe.207  The Court termed the 
Ninth Circuit’s reliance on National Treasury as “seriously mis-
placed.”208  The Court noted that Roe took steps to link his videos and 
the other items he sold on eBay to the department in a way that 
harmed the department.209  The Court observed that San Diego had 
conceded throughout the litigation that Roe’s activities were unre-
lated to his employment.210  The Court, however, wrote that San 
Diego had consistently maintained that Roe’s speech was “detrimen-
tal” to the police department and “harmful to the proper functioning 
of the police force.”211  Accordingly, the Court held that Roe was con-
trolled by Connick and Pickering, rather than by National Treasury. 
The Court next applied Connick.212  The Court held that “public 
concern is something that is a subject of legitimate news interest; that 
is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public 
at the time of publication.”213  Applying this test of public concern, 
 
 202 Id. (quoting United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 
466 (1995)). 
 203 Id. at 1119 (quoting Berger, 779 F.2d at 998). 
 204 Id. (citing Berger, 779 F.2d at 998; Roe v. City & County of San Francisco, 109 
F.3d 578, 585 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 205 Roe, 356 F.3d at 1119. 
 206 Id. at 1119–20. 
 207 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 78 (2004) (per curiam). 
 208 Id. at 81. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. at 83–84. 
 213 Roe, 543 U.S. at 83–84 (emphasis added). 
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the Court concluded that Roe’s speech did not qualify.214  The Court 
pointed to the dissent in Connick to explain why Roe’s speech failed 
to make this even “a close case.”215  The dissenters in Connick con-
cluded that the activities of Myers, the plaintiff in Connick, touched 
upon a matter of public concern because they informed the public 
about how a certain elected official was discharging his duties; but 
Roe’s activities “did nothing to inform the public about any aspect of 
the [police department’s] functioning or operation.”216  Nor was 
Roe’s expression akin to that uttered in Rankin, where the speech was 
related to political news.217 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Speech In, Speech Out 
The ultimate question to be answered in public employee 
speech cases is whether the speech is entitled to the full panoply of 
First Amendment protections.  Because the Pickering balancing test is 
fact sensitive,218 however, there is no general principle applicable to 
the speech in every case.  The issue is whether the speech is at least 
entitled to qualified protection.  Qualified protection means that the 
employer would have to show, in order to permissibly limit the 
speech, that the employee’s speech interfered with the efficiency of 
the operations, as discussed in Pickering.219  The Court in Connick 
made clear that it did not want to constitutionalize workplace per-
sonnel disputes and grievances.220  But what about non-workplace dis-
putes that are non-work-related?  The question arises, do we want to 
offer qualified protection to such speech, and if so, why? 
Autonomy is one of the primary justifications underlying free-
dom of speech221 and the literature on the autonomy justification for 
free speech is quite extensive.222  The Kantian view of autonomy pos-
 
 214 Id. at 84. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. 
 218 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 219 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 220 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983). 
 221 Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against 
Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 989 (2003). 
 222 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875 
(1994); Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public 
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993); Geoffrey R. Stone, Autonomy and Distrust, 
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ited that individuals are to be treated as ends unto themselves, “with a 
right to the greatest liberty compatible with the like liberties of all 
others.”223  A person’s action is limited insofar as it impinges on oth-
ers.224  Charles Fried argued that people are free to arrange their lives 
within their own sphere of liberty.225  Allowing the speech in the fore-
going cases allows people to be autonomous and have a certain de-
gree of control in running their lives. 
Such autonomy should not be merely circumscribed to speech 
that is a matter of public concern.  Under the Kantian view of auton-
omy, speech is valuable in and of itself because individuals are ends 
unto themselves, and protecting one person’s political speech while 
not protecting another’s sexually explicit speech would run counter 
to this assumption.226  In curbing the free speech rights of employees 
away from the workplace, the employee is converted into essentially 
an arm of the State and, in a way, ceases to be her own person.  Peo-
ple are not entirely measured by what they do; they are also measured 
by who they are.  Public concern, in many cases, ceases to allow pub-
lic employees to be who they are, and in so doing, undermines their 
autonomy as individuals.  The speech in Roe, Berger, and Flanagan is 
valuable not because of any tangible benefit it adds to society, but be-
cause it allows the individual to function freely.  Of course, the 
speech may ultimately be unprotected when Pickering is applied,227 but 
the autonomy rationale at least supports providing speech qualified 
protection against government censorship. 
B. Roe’s Red Herring; Connick’s Havoc 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Roe did not overrule the fore-
going lower court cases (except Roe itself) that have interpreted Con-
nick as applying, if at all, very narrowly in out-of-the-workplace cases 
related to employment.228  Accordingly, it will be necessary to take 
 
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1171 (1993); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom 
of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991). 
 223 Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 225, 233 (1992) (citing IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lewis White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1959) (1785); 
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (John Ladd trans., Bobbs-
Merrill Co., 1965) (1797)). 
 224 Fried, supra note 223, at 233. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. 
 227 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 228 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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Connick on its own terms, and reconcile those cases with Connick to 
see whether or not those cases read it correctly. 
i. Roe Did Not So Much Address Public Concern as 
Engage in a Pickering Analysis 
In Roe, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on National Treasury in its 
decision.229  In National Treasury, the Supreme Court held that public 
concern was satisfied because the speech at issue occurred outside 
the workplace and was unrelated to the employees’ employment.230  
The Court in National Treasury essentially ascribed the same meaning 
to Connick as did the Fourth Circuit in Berger, and to a lesser extent, 
the Tenth Circuit in Flanagan.231  Coupled with Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence, National Treasury stands for the proposition that Connick 
excised from constitutional protection a very narrow category of 
speech.232 
The Supreme Court in Roe, however, rejected the comparison to 
National Treasury by holding that the San Diego Police Department 
(“SDPD”) had been injured by Roe’s activities.233  This analysis, how-
ever, does not address public concern so much as it addresses the 
other side of the constitutional equation: the balancing inquiry under 
Pickering.  The Court wrote of the “detriment[]” to the SDPD and the 
“harm[]” to the police force.234  This statement mirrors the language 
that typically guides the Pickering analysis, which requires the em-
ployer to show that the employee’s speech would harm the efficiency 
of its operations.235  Instead, the National Treasury Court was conduct-
ing a public concern analysis.236  When the Court in Roe wrote that the 
case “falls outside the protection afforded in [National Treasury],”237 it 
confused the role of National Treasury in the Court’s employee free 
speech jurisprudence.  National Treasury does not offer “protection” 
as much as it merely applies Connick—and it does so fairly narrowly at 
 
 229 Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 543 U.S. 77 
(2004). 
 230 United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995). 
 231 See id. at 466; see Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1563 (10th Cir. 1989) 
(“[T]he public concern test was not intended to apply to situations of this type.”); 
Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998-99 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that speech outside 
the workplace and unrelated to work is subject to qualified protection under Con-
nick). 
 232 Nat’l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 466. 
 233 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80–82 (2004) (per curiam). 
 234 Id. at 81. 
 235 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 236 Nat’l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 466. 
 237 Roe, 543 U.S. at 82. 
SHOOMAN FINAL 5/30/2006  9:26:22 PM 
2006] COMMENT 1363 
that.238  Accordingly, the Court chose to apply Connick instead of Na-
tional Treasury.239  This is, of course, an improper choice because the 
two cases are not mutually exclusive.240  Indeed, the National Treasury 
court applied Connick straightforwardly for the proposition that cer-
tain speech falls within Connick’s definition of public concern when it 
occurs outside the workplace and is unrelated to work.241 
The principle that emerges from the Court’s discussion of Na-
tional Treasury is that National Treasury will be disregarded where there 
is harm to the employer.242  The logical endpoint of this principle is 
that courts can simply bypass the public concern analysis where there 
has been a showing of discrete harm to the employer and move right 
to Pickering.  It is possible that, in Roe, the Supreme Court found the 
Ninth Circuit’s reliance on National Treasury “seriously misplaced”243 
because such reliance compelled the conclusion that Roe’s activities 
were, in fact, matters of public concern under National Treasury. 
Thus, the correct reading of Roe is that the Court ascribed such 
low value to Roe’s speech—his engaging in sexually explicit conduct 
on film—that the Court simply chose not to protect it.  The case is an 
outlier in the public concern cases and it should not be read as a ve-
hicle by which to explicate Connick.  To be sure, Roe certainly elabo-
rates on the definitional aspect of Connick insofar as it defines the 
contours of public concern.244  But by implicitly applying Pickering, 
and by merely rejecting National Treasury’s application in the instant 
case, Roe does not answer the question of how Connick should gener-
ally be applied to cases that involve speech made outside the work-
place, unrelated to employment.  Instead, Roe left National Treasury’s 
discussion of public concern standing, and in doing so, left open the 
possibility that speech directed at a public audience, made outside 
the workplace, and unrelated to the employee’s government em-
ployment, fulfills Connick’s conception of public concern. 
ii. Connick: Why Public Concern in Outside-the-Workplace 
Cases is a Doctrinal Failure 
Connick is a doctrinal failure.  Connick’s public concern doctrine 
exempts so much speech from protection that it fails to protect even 
 
 238 See Nat’l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 466. 
 239 Roe, 543 U.S. at 83–84. 
 240 See Nat’l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 466. 
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the most innocuous employee speech that occurs off campus and is 
unrelated to work. 
It is clear that Connick did not contemplate cases where the em-
ployee’s speech was non-work related and occurred outside the 
workplace.245  As Professor Lee points out, Connick made clear that 
grievances over personnel matters did not constitute matters of pub-
lic concern.246  However, Professor Lee also points out that the Court 
in Rankin fit, within the Connick framework, speech that most assur-
edly was not a matter of public concern.247  Connick purports to tell us 
that speech that is a matter of public concern will be protected by 
showing us what speech is not a matter of public concern.248  This is 
the doctrinal conundrum borne by Connick, and it is hardly confined 
to cases that involve speech that occurs outside the workplace.249  
Connick could have confined its holding to personnel or intra-office 
disputes or power struggles.  Instead, it painted with a broad brush, 
requiring that the speech touch upon a matter of public concern to 
even reach balancing under the Pickering test.250  The question arises, 
though, whether it is legitimate to read Connick as suggesting that all 
speech other than internal personnel disputes or employee grievances 
constitute matters of public concern.  Put another way, should Con-
nick be read as the lower court cases suggest,251 that it simply excises 
from the First Amendment’s protection a narrow class of cases, rather 
than fixing the limits of constitutional protection? 
Before undertaking that analysis, it is worthwhile to consider 
what “public concern” really means.  Connick does not really define it, 
except only to hold one part of Myers’s questionnaire as touching 
upon it.252  One commentator notes that public concern or public in-
 
 245 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983). 
 246 Cynthia K. Y. Lee, Comment, Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace: A Comment 
on the Public Concern Requirement, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1109, 1126 (1988). 
 247 Id. 
 248 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–49. 
 249 See, e.g., Lewis v. Harrison Sch. Dist., 805 F.2d 310, 313–17 (8th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that a high school principal’s criticism of a superintendent’s speech was 
protected even though the matter involved a personnel dispute, where the matter 
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 250 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. 
 251 See Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations 
omitted), rev’d, 543 U.S. 77 (2004); Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1562 (10th 
Cir. 1989); Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 252 Connick, 461 U.S. at 149. 
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terest may be viewed in either an objective or a subjective sense.253  
When viewed subjectively, the inquiry is whether or not the public is, 
in actuality, concerned with the speech.254  As an objective matter, 
however, something may be a matter of public interest even if no one 
is subjectively interested in it.255  R. George Wright argued that the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence aims to protect speech that concerns 
the “legitimacy of the political process,” speech that is popularly ac-
cepted, or speech that captures the attention of the media.256 
Viewed through this lens, it is quite difficult to argue that the 
speech in Berger and Flanagan rose to matters of public concern un-
der Connick.  This Comment has explained why Connick’s public con-
cern language was generally unnecessary to decide the case before 
it.257  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court specifically went out of its way 
to erect a threshold requirement to move on to the Pickering balanc-
ing test.258  The court in Berger held only that Berger’s imitation of Al 
Jolson in blackface constituted a matter of public concern because it 
was not a workplace grievance.259  The Berger court’s logic is forceful 
insofar as it suggests that Connick should not be read to compel re-
sults that are not in harmony with the reasons underlying its decision.  
Nonetheless, the Berger court’s decision also has the effect of writing 
the public concern test out of existence; if anything that is not a 
workplace personnel dispute or complaint is a matter of public con-
cern, then public concern has been effectively drained of all mean-
ing.260 
The National Treasury Court arrived at its holding in virtually the 
same way as the Berger court reached its decision.261  The Court in Na-
tional Treasury made no effort to describe how the plaintiffs’ activities 
rose to matters of public concern, instead focusing on how the plain-
tiffs’ activities were unlike those activities the Court chose not to pro-
tect in Connick.262  Once again, such a reading of Connick is unfaithful 
 
 253 See R. George Wright, Speech on Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 27, 34–35 (1987). 
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. at 35. 
 256 Id. at 35–36 (quoting Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778 
(1986)). 
 257 See supra Part IV.B.ii. 
 258 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–49 (1983). 
 259 Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998–99 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 260 See D. Gordon Smith, Comment, Beyond “Public Concern”: New Free Speech Stan-
dards for Public Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 262–63 (1990) (“[T]he Fourth Cir-
cuit [in Berger] turned Connick on its head.”). 
 261 See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995). 
 262 Id. 
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to Connick’s conception of public concern because it treats Connick as 
having not mentioned the concept at all.  Public concern is the 
linchpin of Connick. 
After Roe refined Connick’s conception of public concern, the 
consequences of these two decisions are far reaching.  It is unclear 
how courts will apply Roe and National Treasury, but because Roe is the 
Court’s latest pronouncement on the subject, National Treasury’s dis-
cussion of public concern may fall by the wayside.  If National Treasury 
did not apply in Roe, when would it ever apply?  In National Treasury, 
the Court should have conducted a public concern analysis before 
reaching Pickering.  The Connick/Roe public concern doctrine con-
flated the Connick/Pickering analyses by considering the harm to the 
employer.263 
Implicit in the Roe Court’s treatment of National Treasury, then, is 
that Pickering considerations also inform the analysis in Connick.264  
This is a doctrinal quagmire.  The public concern analysis is supposed 
to function as a threshold requirement to even reach Pickering.  Per-
haps the lesson to be gleaned from Roe is that speech that is so far be-
yond the conception of “newsworthiness” is entitled to no protection 
at all.  One wonders whether the Roe Court overruled sub silentio the 
public concern holding of National Treasury and merely replaced it 
with its “newsworthiness” standard.  The overarching point is that the 
Supreme Court did not explicitly cast aside National Treasury, which 
reaches a far different conception of public concern than does Roe.265  
Due to the Supreme Court’s confounding treatment of the issue in 
Roe, courts will likely struggle with the question of when National 
Treasury applies. 
If the Supreme Court in Roe chose not to protect Roe’s speech 
because of its low First Amendment value, and Connick’s public con-
cern requirement is most properly read as having teeth, then we are 
left with a First Amendment that offers little protection to the free 
speech rights of public employees when they speak outside the work-
place on matters unrelated to their employment.  Courts applying the 
Connick analysis to speech that occurs outside the workplace that is 
unrelated to work are writing the Pickering analysis out of existence.  
 
 263 See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 81 (2004) (per curiam). 
 264 Id. at 82–85. 
 265 Compare Nat’l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 466 (speech addressed a public audience, 
made outside the workplace, and largely not involving government employ entitled 
to presumptive protection under Connick), with Roe, 543 U.S. at 84 (speech addressed 
a public audience, made outside the workplace, and largely not involving govern-
ment employ not entitled to protection under Connick). 
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The very essence of Connick is that the government should not have 
to justify an adverse employment decision when speech is not about a 
matter of public concern.266  In formulating the public concern doc-
trine, however, the court launched a missile to kill a mouse.267  Since 
the speech at issue does not occur at work, it is likely that the speech 
is not about work.  Because the speech is not about work, the Connick 
Court’s concern of personnel disputes planting the seeds of constitu-
tional cases diminishes greatly. 
What remains is speech that would otherwise be entitled to full 
protection in the absence of the employee’s government employ-
ment.  What justifies the employee’s loss of her free speech rights, 
then, is the notion that the speech may somehow harm the employer.  
When viewed this way, Connick is simply a superfluous hurdle for 
plaintiffs to jump.  One may argue that by virtue of the governmental 
employ, the employee should have to overcome certain hurdles and 
the employer should enjoy wide latitude in curbing the speech of its 
employees.  But when the speech occurs outside of work, the public 
concern test is like trying to put a square peg in a round hole because 
the central concern of Connick is that internal personnel matters are 
not protected by the First Amendment.268  Connick’s concern is ren-
dered irrelevant when the speech is unrelated to employment.  There 
is a doctrinal and policy-based solution to Connick which is more 
speech protective and more doctrinally coherent than Connick. 
V. A DOCTRINAL AND POLICY BASED SOLUTION: FLANAGAN AND 
PROTECTED EXPRESSION 
Connick, while having teeth, is also an albatross, and the court in 
Flanagan treated it as such.269  Where Berger strained to apply it, 
Flanagan chose to ignore it.270  The Flanagan approach is less funda-
mentally at odds with Connick than it first appears to be.  Flanagan 
held simply that Connick does not apply to speech that occurs outside 
the workplace and is unrelated to the employee’s employment.271  In 
light of Roe, do courts even have to apply Connick in these situations?  
One commentator has argued that because the court in Rankin ex-
tended Connick to a comment unrelated to the employee’s employ-
 
 266 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–49 (1983). 
 267 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1036 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). 
 268 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. 
 269 Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1562–65 (10th Cir. 1989). 
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. at 1564–65. 
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ment, Connick still applies.272  Connick and Rankin, however, do not 
purport to address situations where the conduct does not occur at 
work.273  One might argue instead that Roe overruled Flanagan be-
cause Roe applied Connick to this type of fact pattern.274  Roe did not 
formulate a new principle of law, however, as much as it overturned 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision because the conduct was not, in the Su-
preme Court’s view, a matter of public concern.  Roe left open the 
possibility that Connick does not apply away from the workplace be-
cause Roe only addressed the parties’ specific situation rather than the 
broad doctrinal issue of whether Connick applies in these types of 
cases.275 
The counterargument is, of course, that Roe implicitly held as 
such by applying Connick.  However, Roe did not set forth any new 
principle of law.  Roe merely redefined public concern and held that 
Roe’s activities did not meet the threshold.276  Explicitly left open was 
the possibility that Connick did not apply in cases like Roe because the 
Supreme Court did not make such a holding.277  The Roe decision is 
more properly viewed as correcting what the Court saw as a clearly er-
roneous decision from the Ninth Circuit.278 
This Comment proposes the abandonment of Connick where 
employee speech occurs away from work and is unrelated to em-
ployment.279  Instead of Connick, a refined type of Flanagan test should 
apply.  The inquiry should be whether the employee’s speech is pro-
tected by the First Amendment, and if it is, whether the speech in-
vokes the specter of imminent harm such that the employer should 
not have to justify its action under Pickering. 
Under Flanagan, an employer would first ask whether the em-
ployee engaged in protected expression.280  If the answer is yes, then 
the employer would necessarily have to weigh its interests in curbing 
the speech at issue against punishing the employee who spoke.281  
This is, of course, no different than the decisions that government 
employers currently make.  The only difference is that, in the absence 
 
 272 See Smith, supra note 260, at 264. 
 273 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S 378, 384 (1987); Connick, 461 U.S. at 154. 
 274 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004) (per curiam). 
 275 Id. at 84–85. 
 276 Id. at 84. 
 277 Id. at 82–85. 
 278 Id. at 84. 
 279 This Comment is not the first place that someone has proposed a partial aban-
donment of Connick.  See Smith, supra note 260, at 262. 
 280 Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1564–65 (10th Cir. 1989). 
 281 Id. at 1565–67. 
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of actual harm, the employer will have to evaluate whether the harm 
to its operation is imminent.  Otherwise, the employer will have to 
presume that the speech is protected unless the speech interferes 
with the employer’s operation such that the employer would win un-
der Pickering.282  The result is that employers would not be able to in-
hibit employees’ speech outside of work unless their speech was im-
minently harmful, or unless the employer could actually show that the 
speech hampered its operations.  With the public concern test aban-
doned, all speech otherwise deserving of First Amendment protection 
would be presumptively protected. 
Employers would still have an “out” if they could show that harm 
was imminent.  To show how this would work as a matter of practice, 
it is clear that in cases like Roe, Berger, and Flanagan an employer 
would not be able to make the requisite showing.  In Roe, the harm 
alleged to befall the police department was grossly exaggerated by the 
Supreme Court.  If someone other than a member of the department 
had actually identified Roe in one of his videos as an officer in the 
department, it is possible that the reputation of the department 
could have been harmed.  However, it is entirely unclear why this 
harm in the abstract should outweigh Roe’s right to engage in activity 
that is otherwise protected, unless the department could show actual 
harm under Pickering.  The harm in Roe, nebulous at best, is far from 
immediate.283  In Berger, the harm to the department was not immedi-
ate either.  Indeed, Berger was only fired after the department had 
suffered actual harm,284 and thus Pickering was the appropriate stan-
dard for the Berger court to apply to Berger’s speech.285  Finally, in 
Flanagan, it is unclear whether the plaintiffs’ sales of adult videotapes 
harmed the department at all,286 much less presented the specter of 
imminent harm when the department found out about their activi-
ties. 
A case where the imminent harm test would likely be satisfied is 
one with facts like Melzer v. Board of Education.287  In Melzer, plaintiff 
Paul Melzer was terminated from his position as a school teacher be-
cause of his membership in the North American Man/Boy Love As-
 
 282 See Smith, supra note 260, at 269. 
 283 See Roe, 543 U.S. at 78–79. 
 284 See Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 995 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 285 Notwithstanding the Berger court’s misconstruction of Connick, see supra notes 
259–60 and accompanying text, the court’s application of the Pickering standard was 
proper. 
 286 See Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1560–61. 
 287 336 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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sociation.288  Melzer’s membership in the organization was eventually 
discovered by the school and was widely reported in the media.289  
Melzer alleged that his termination violated his First Amendment 
rights to free speech and association.290  The school district argued 
that the public airing of Melzer’s activities made it impossible for him 
to effectively continue as a teacher.291  The court assumed that the 
public concern test was satisfied and struck the balance under 
Pickering in favor of the school district, upholding his dismissal.292 
The school district could have made a showing that Melzer’s 
continued employment at the school would result in imminent harm.  
It is more likely than not that the school district would suffer harm 
from the revelation of a public school teacher’s membership in a 
group that openly advocates the abolition of age of consent and child 
pornography laws.293  This is not to suggest that Melzer would neces-
sarily have harmed anybody.294  It is, instead, only to point out that the 
possible harms that could have befallen the school were many, and the 
disruption eventually caused by the revelation of Melzer’s member-
ship was entirely predictable.295  In this unique circumstance, the 
school district should not have had to show that its interests out-
weighed Melzer’s interests. 
This is, indeed, the tradeoff in abandoning the public concern 
test.  Abandoning the test assures that other speech, while perhaps 
not of the highest First Amendment value, will be presumptively pro-
tected, but gives government employers an out if they are inevitably 
going to be harmed by the employee’s speech or by the continued 
employment of the employee.  Such a tradeoff will have the effect of 
allowing more speech in, but also gives employers a tool to address 
speech that will, unlike in Roe, actually harm them.  The ultimate goal 
of the test is to permit employees to do as they wish when they are not 
at work, as long as the government remains unharmed. 
 
 288 Id. at 189–90. 
 289 Id. at 190–91. 
 290 Id. at 192. 
 291 Id. 
 292 Id. at 196–200. 
 293 Melzer, 336 F.3d at 189. 
 294 Indeed, there was no evidence that Melzer had broken any laws.  Id. at 189. 
 295 The counterargument, mentioned in Melzer, is that such disruption effectively 
amounts to a heckler’s veto on Melzer’s speech.  Id. at 199.  The very substance of 
this area of law, however, assumes that the public employees’ speech is, in some in-
stances, at the whim of the body politic.  Otherwise courts would not engage in any 
balancing at all. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In Roe, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to clarify its 
free speech jurisprudence as it relates to speech by public employees 
that occurs outside of work and is unrelated to work.  Instead, the 
Court issued a confounding decision that will likely confuse the lower 
courts.  Courts will continue to struggle to apply the case law to this 
category of speech until the Supreme Court addresses it directly.  The 
solution proposed in this Comment would leave courts in the posi-
tion of applying the Pickering analysis to employee speech that occurs 
outside the workplace without the added struggle of defining when 
the speech is of public concern—a relatively useless inquiry for this 
category of speech unless one envisions a world where the govern-
ment employee is an ever-functioning arm of the State.  Because a 
person should not lose his autonomy by virtue of working for the 
government, the Court should reject this vision, and offer this cate-
gory of speech qualified First Amendment protection. 
 
